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The crisis in Iraq and the twists and turns 
of Turkish Middle East policy 
Krzysztof Strachota 
The spectacular offensive by Islamic radicals in Iraq this June has led the country to the verge 
of collapse, and is another scene of the deep crisis in the Middle East, in which Turkey is entan-
gled. The immediate consequence of this is a severe crisis of prestige after the kidnapping by 
terrorists of Turkish diplomats and Ankara’s inability to resolve the situation; in the long term 
consequences include escalation of the Kurdish problem, and a further increase in threats to 
the security of Turkey itself as well as the fundamental principles of its foreign policy. Both 
Ankara’s options and its political will to actively respond to the crisis are extremely limited. 
Yet again in recent years, the current crisis, the broader situation in the Middle East, and final-
ly the position of Turkey in the region elude unambiguous assessments and forecasts – these 
are prevented by the scale and growth of the reappraisals and tensions in the region. The only 
undoubted fact is that Turkey is strategically and irreversibly entangled in the Middle East’s 
problems, which are an important factor affecting the transformation of the state which 
the ruling AKP is implementing; and in the near future, this state of affairs will only deepen. 
The ISIS offensive in Iraq – a new phase 
of the crisis in the Middle East 
The deepening instability of Turkey’s southern 
neighbourhood over recent years – from the two 
US-led interventions in Iraq, the ‘Arab Spring’ 
and civil war in Syria (since 2011), the accompa-
nying turbulence in the region, along with the 
spectacular offensive by the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in June – has entered a new, 
dangerous phase. Within a month, the forces of 
one of the most radical terrorist organisations in 
the region took control of most of the area of 
Iraq inhabited by Sunni Arabs, the transport ro-
utes in western Iraq, and the country’s second 
largest city of Mosul, and has brought the fight 
to the immediate vicinity of Baghdad. Simulta-
neously with the ISIS offensive, the Kurds of nor-
thern Iraq occupied the rich, disputed Kirkuk oil 
fields as well as a number of towns in the vicinity 
of the Kurdistan Region. The situation appeared 
to have been brought under control: ISIS stop-
ped at the border of the Shiite-dominated are-
as, and it is unlikely that they will continue their 
offensive in the near future; the prospect of ex-
pelling ISIS from the areas they have occupied is 
supported by both Iraq’s influential neighbours 
(Iran, Saudi Arabia, but also Syria), and the US 
and Russia. Despite this, however, this can be 
seen as a deep crisis, if not the potential collap-
se of the Iraqi state. 
Baghdad’s attempts to regain control of the ter-
ritory have not been successful. The shocking 
ease with which small ISIS units occupied vast 
areas of Iraq in June has called the rapid resto-
ration of the state’s authority over the lost are-
as into doubt, both among the army and the 
general public. Also, the Kurds have promised 
that not only will they remain in the cities they 
have occupied (especially Kirkuk), but also that 
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they will a referendum on the independence 
of Kurdistan. Now less than 40% of the coun-
try is under the effective control of Baghdad. 
The problems are as follows: the stability and 
legitimacy of government; the current (Shiite-
-dominated) authoritarianism of Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Maliki; the prolonged paralysis of the 
parliament elected on 30 April (which has sin-
ce been boycotted by Kurds and Arab Sunnis); 
and the uncertainty of the compromise among 
the main political forces, which was forced on 
them by external forces at the end of July.
The successes for ISIS have created a new po-
litical reality in Iraq and throughout the region. 
A leading terrorist organisation has taken control 
of significant areas of the state, acquired large 
quantities of weapons abandoned by the Iraqi 
army, has gained a huge injection of cash (since 
the occupation of Mosul, they have acquired ap-
proximately US$2 billion in cash, counting inco-
me from the occupied oil fields in Iraq and Syria, 
for example), and finally they have significantly 
raised the bar of their political aspirations, proc-
laiming the restoration of the caliphate (anno-
uncing the creation of an Islamic state and the 
appointment of a caliph on 29 June), aspiring 
to sovereignty over all the world’s Muslims 
(including al-Qaeda itself, along with other ter-
rorist groups), and aspiring to the extermination 
of Shiism as a heresy. One immediate effect of 
the new state of affairs was the July offensive 
by ISIS in Syria – against the Kurds, the compe-
ting opposition groups and the forces of the re-
gime – using the heavy equipment they gained 
in Iraq. In parallel, the question of possible ISIS 
expansion into the territories of Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan and Lebanon became urgent. 
The current crisis in Iraq is only one part of 
a deep crisis in the region, which includes the 
bitter conflict between Sunni and Shia (which is 
an element of the strategic Saudi-Iranian con-
flict), the problem of political stability and con-
trol of territory in almost every country of the 
region, the empowerment of non-state play-
ers (from terrorist organisations to ethnic gro-
ups, especially the Kurds), and social dynamics 
(the displacement of about 11 million refugees 
from Syria and Iraq during the last three years). 
An additional element is the collapse of the exi-
sting system of security and alliances related 
to the weakening of the US presence, among 
other factors; the crisis in Egypt; rising tensions 
between countries; and finally, the potential 
uncertainty about the future of US-Iranian re-
lations (including the ongoing dialogue about 
the future of the Iranian nuclear programme). 
Turkey balancing on the precipice
A direct consequence of the ISIS offensive in Iraq 
for Turkey was the occupation of its Consulate 
General in Mosul and the taking of 49 hosta-
ges (diplomats, family members, security gu-
ards and others), as well as the detention of 31 
Turkish truck drivers. This situation, fatal for the 
country’s image and potentially politically dan-
gerous (in the pre-election period, raising con-
troversy about Turkey’s Middle East policy), has 
been hushed up in Turkey by banning the publi-
cation of information on this topic in the media. 
Turkey has not emphasised the issue in interna-
tional relations (including with NATO during the 
visit by its secretary general in June), and in fact 
undertook secret negotiations with ISIS, which 
led to the release of the detained drivers (4 July). 
The talks which the Turkish government held 
with the United States and Iran regarding the 
situation in Iraq have brought no clear or prac-
tical results. Official statements are dominated 
by a tone of serious concern about the situation 
The current crisis in Iraq is only one part of 
a deep crisis in the region, which includes 
the problem of political stability and con-
trol of territory in almost every country 
of the region, and the empowerment of 
non-state players.
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in Iraq and declarations of support for the unity 
of the country (although in June surprising sug-
gestions were made that Turkey should recogni-
se the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan).
In a broader sense, the current crisis in Iraq is 
part of the fundamental challenges that Turkey 
faces in the Middle East; its stake is rising si-
gnificantly, and is influencing Turkey’s strategic 
situation and the assumptions of its foreign po-
licy over the last twelve years (i.e. since the AKP 
took power). 
The Middle East, with which Turkey’s relations 
had been limited and cool until 2002, has pro-
vided the AKP with an opportunity for a strate-
gic diversification from its dominant relations 
with the West: Ankara’s political activity aimed 
at close cooperation and economic activity, ba-
sed on the search for new markets and sour-
ces of energy and investments, was intended 
to strengthen Turkey’s position both vis-à-vis 
the West and globally. Although the effects of 
the ‘Arab Spring’ significantly reduced Turkish 
ambitions, in 2013 Iraq (de facto the Kurdistan 
Region in Iraq) was the second largest export 
market for Turkey after Germany, and was 
a key land route in the Gulf region and the 
Indian Ocean basin. The destabilisation (and 
especially the prospect of the collapse) of Iraq, 
in the light of the ongoing conflict in Syria and 
related complications, has called the reality of 
Turkish policy towards the Middle East into qu-
estion, and brings with it the risk of measura-
ble economic losses (from export restrictions, 
and thus production and logistics, to an expec-
ted increase in energy prices). Worse, possible 
economic turmoil in Turkey, as well as a rise in 
tension on its borders, threaten a deterioration 
of its image in the eyes of key investors and len-
ders in the West. 
From the AKP’s perspective, the Middle East 
was a natural zone of Turkish influence based 
on its historical (Ottoman) and cultural (Islam) 
heritage, as well as the political and economic 
success of Turkey, which drew creatively and ef-
fectively on Western models while preserving 
its cultural identity (the so-called Turkish mo-
del). Turkey aspired to the position of a model 
for of change in the region, at the expense of 
the aspirations for regional supremacy of Sau-
di Arabia, Egypt and Iran. Turkey’s impressive 
successes in this field, obtained by ‘soft power’, 
were interrupted by the civil war in Syria. Here, 
however, Turkey took up the challenge, aspiring 
to the position of the main mediator, and over 
time it became the patron of the armed Syrian 
opposition. This policy ultimately suffered a pa-
inful defeat: the Assad regime not only rema-
ined in place, but also initiated counteroffensi-
ve; and radical terrorist organisations linked to 
groups in the Persian Gulf began to dominate 
among the opposition. In the end, Turkey was 
exposed to serious problems: almost a million 
refugees after incidents involving the Syrian ar-
med forces, and terrorist attacks and sabota-
ge carried out by the Kurdish PKK. At the same 
time Turkey’s relations with almost all the coun-
tries of the region (including Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt and Iraq) definitely worsened; where-
upon Iran and Saudi Arabia, not Turkey, came 
to set the tone for Middle East policy. Turkey’s 
image as an attractive mentor and patron for 
the Middle East has been severely tarnished. 
The current crisis in Iraq seems to confirm and 
deepen the processes outlined in recent years; 
Turkey is not seen as a player capable of si-
gnificantly influencing the stabilisation of Iraq 
(especially in the light of its helplessness in 
the hostage crisis), and nor does it now aspire 
to such a role; and it has even been accused 
of actually making possible (in extreme cases 
deliberately so) and fuelling the Iraqi crisis. 
The destabilisation of Iraq, in the light of 
the ongoing conflict in Syria has called 
the reality of Turkish policy towards the 
Middle East into question, and brings with 
it the risk of measurable economic losses.
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In the present situation it is highly likely that 
Turkey itself will be affected by the negative 
consequences of the collapse of Iraq and the 
strengthening of the terrorist para-state cove-
ring a large part of Iraq and Syria, and direc-
tly bordering on Turkey. In practice, this would 
mean the reversal of Ankara’s role as the West’s 
proxy in the Middle East (to which Turkey open-
ly aspired as late as 2011), in favour of that of 
a petitioner demanding protection against 
the challenges in its neighbourhood. 
The Middle East has finally come to have 
a direct impact on one of Turkey’s most im-
portant domestic problems: the Kurdish issue. 
For almost its entire existence, the nationalist 
Turkish Republic denied the existence of the 
Kurdish people, and from the mid-1980s it fo-
ught ruthlessly against the rising autonomist/
separatist ambitions of the Kurds. The common 
fear of Kurdish separatism significantly reduced 
the tension between Turkey and Iran, Iraq and 
(to the least extent) Syria, the other countries 
which also faced this problem. As a result of 
the first and second Gulf Wars, the Iraqi Kurds 
gained actual and formal autonomy; as a result 
of the civil war in Syria, the Syrian Kurds have 
effectively won autonomy (Rojava, western 
Kurdistan, the de facto Kurdish state in Syria). 
And although the AKP has undergone a pro-
found revision of its policy towards the Kurds 
(liberalisation of domestic policy, and a start 
to the difficult peace process, in parallel with 
close economic and political cooperation with 
Iraqi Kurdistan), the Kurdish problem is actually 
growing. In 2011-2012, there was an eruption 
of clashes with Kurds in Turkey, which may also 
be seen as inspired by Damascus as a retaliatory 
measure against the involvement of Turkey in 
Syria. Today – for yet another year – the autono-
my of Syrian Kurdistan is strengthening, which 
is especially dangerous for Turkey as it is based 
on the structures of the PKK, which is the most 
anti-Turkish of the forces among the Kurds, and 
has for thirty years been directing the Kurdish 
rebellion in Turkey. Meanwhile, in June the 
Iraqi Kurds took Kirkuk (despite their excellent 
cooperation with the Iraqi Kurds, Ankara war-
ned against such a move as offering a poten-
tial reason for military intervention), and have 
announced moves towards full independence. 
A Kurdish state in Iraq (and perhaps Syria in the 
future) would spell the inevitable growth of the 
Turkish Kurds’ ambitions, and by extension a se-
rious escalation of tensions within Turkey itself. 
Despite the seriousness of the current situation 
in Iraq (and more broadly across the region) 
it is difficult to expect the government in Anka-
ra to take decisive measures. Even in the case 
of the Syrian conflict, Turkey – to its conside-
rable embarrassment – has acknowledged the 
unrealistic assumptions of its own policies, and 
also that these has been relatively ineffective, 
or even counterproductive. Furthermore, it has 
had to contend with criticism on the dome-
stic scene from part of the elite and the me-
dia, while stating at the same time that the 
Turkish public are not particularly interested in 
Middle Eastern politics, and does not make its 
support for the government conditional on any 
successes in this area. As a result, Ankara has 
significantly reduced both its ambitions and 
its actions regarding Syria. The current crisis in 
Iraq seems to reinforce the conclusions coming 
from Syria: Turkey seems unable and unintere-
sted in actively working to take advantage of 
the crisis, and is not even ready to raise the 
stakes regarding the diplomats held captive by 
the ISIS. Given that Turkey’s first general presi-
dential election is to be held on 10 August this 
Given that Turkey’s first general presiden-
tial election is to be held on 10 August 
this year and parliamentary elections next 
year, Turkey should maintain its defen-
sive position and focus on minimising the 
losses which it may incur from the current 
crisis in Iraq.
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year (and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
is counting on victory in the first round), and 
parliamentary elections next year (in which the 
AKP can also count on a decisive victory), Tur-
key should maintain its defensive position and 
focus on minimising the losses which it may in-
cur from the current crisis in Iraq. 
Has the game just begun? 
Both the situation in the Middle East and Tur-
key’s policies have for several years now posed 
serious challenges of interpretation. This is an 
area of dynamic change and redefinition, which 
eludes precise assessment, not to mention ex-
plicit predictions which can be confirmed; this 
has been reflected, inter alia, with regard to the 
‘Arab Spring’, the civil war in Syria, the evolu-
tion and goals of Turkey’s policies, or US regio-
nal policy – which hitherto had been relatively 
predictable. One hypothesis explaining this 
state of affairs may be that the assumptions 
adopted in the West considering the situ-
ation, intentions, estimates and circumstances 
of the regional players have been inadequate. 
This also applies to Turkey itself. 
First of all, since the AKP came to power, Tur-
key has been undergoing profound transforma-
tions, both domestically as well as in redefining 
its foreign policy. One of the assumptions of 
the latter is the belief, formulated over many 
years, of an imminent crisis and subsequent 
revision of the political order (internationally, 
but also socio-culturally) in the Middle East – 
a position that is also becoming increasingly 
popular in the West. In the assumptions of the 
main ideologue of foreign policy, the foreign 
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, this will of course 
create opportunities for Turkey to restore its hi-
storic role as a real political and civilisational 
power covering its neighbourhood, but also 
as a significant force on the global scale. From 
the end of the Cold War to now, this diagnosis 
of the Middle East has been confirmed. These 
processes are independent of Turkey, and inde-
ed somewhat inevitable – they are beyond the 
unequivocal control of any other country, and 
pose a serious challenge and a potential threat 
to all of them. In other words, Turkey’s involve-
ment in the problems of its immediate vicini-
ty is inevitable, and the scale and dynamics of 
these processes do not allow us today to clearly 
assess when the final turning point will arrive, 
not what its result will be. Turkey’s situation 
currently seems to be unfavourable, and to of-
fer it very limited room for manoeuvre. Never-
theless, the hand Turkey has to play is better 
(thanks to its influence in Iraqi Kurdistan), and 
even the risks arising from the current situation 
in Iraq are less for Ankara than for Saudi Ara-
bia, which is directly threatened, Jordan, Iraq 
itself, Syria, Egypt, Iran (which previously was 
the leader in the game for the Middle East), and 
the United States. 
The second question involves an assessment of 
the activity and efficiency of Turkish policy in 
the region, especially in Iraq. Here the question 
arises of Turkey’s lack of allies in the region, as 
well as the actual deterioration of its relations 
with every country in the region over the past 
three years. It also indicates Turkey’s erroneous 
calculation to support the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Egypt and Syria) and its risky policy towards 
the Kurds. As a result, Turkish policy has come 
to be seen as unrealistic and ineffective. Howe-
ver, if we consider the issue through the lens of 
the evolutionary yet thorough reconstruction 
of Turkish policy in the region, there are both 
The Middle East and Turkey’s policies 
have for several years now posed serious 
challenges of interpretation. One hypoth-
esis explaining this state of affairs may be 
that the assumptions adopted in the West 
considering the situation, intentions, esti-
mates and circumstances of the regional 
players have been inadequate. 
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real and potential achievements. The change 
in Ankara’s approach (liberalisation) towards 
the Kurds has given it the chance to gradual-
ly resolve the issue in Turkey itself; in the case 
of Iraqi Kurdistan, meanwhile, it is crucial for 
maintaining the region’s stability and political 
and economic development – which is espe-
cially apparent against the background of its 
neighbours. For Turkey itself, Iraqi Kurdistan is 
a field of economic expansion, including in the 
strategic energy sector (the weakness of the 
government in Baghdad greatly facilitates this 
cooperation), as well as a strong buffer on its 
southern borders inhibiting the expansion of 
terrorists and (to some extent) counterbalan-
cing the Kurds affiliated with the PKK (which 
is in fierce competition for predominance with 
the Barzani family which rules Kurdistan; the 
PKK enjoys broad support, especially among 
Turkish Kurds). 
In the present – and in the expected future – 
balance of forces, Iraqi Kurdistan will have no 
alternative but to orient itself towards Turkey. 
Ankara’s faith in the power of its instruments 
has helped some politicians to formulate some 
opinions, shocking to recent Turkish policy dog-
mas and regional opinion, of possibly recogni-
sing the independence of Kurdistan (which is 
a de facto Turkish protectorate). Despite the far 
worse relations between Turkey and the Kurds 
of Rojava, who are directly linked to the PKK, 
political dialogue is taking place even here, and 
the scope for a strategic compromise between 
Turkey and the Kurds is being examined (open 
conflict would have very bad consequences for 
Turkey, and disastrous results for the Kurds). 
A separate issue is Turkey’s relations with ISIS. 
Since the beginning of the conflict, Turkish ter-
ritory has been a major transit route for foreign 
volunteers going to jihad in Syria, and Turkey 
has been their informal hinterland. Basically, 
this can be explained as either naivety or in-
competence on the part of Turkey’s politicians 
and security forces (under pressure from the 
West Turkey significantly tightened its securi-
ty this spring). On the other hand, there have 
been regular accusations by the Assad regime 
in Damascus, the authorities in Baghdad, the 
Syrian Kurds, the Iranian media, and also by the 
Turkish opposition, informants from the Turkish 
security services and Western experts that Tur-
key is actively and consciously supporting the 
radicals (including ISIS), arming them, provi-
ding shelter and medical services, or tolerating 
oil exports from fields occupied by ISIS in Syria 
– and in extreme cases, that it is even inspiring 
their actions (including the recent offensive 
in Iraq). The charges are part of the chaos of 
information and immensely popular conspira-
cy theories which mask the obvious difficulty 
in interpreting the situation in the region. We 
can assume that there are very likely to be nu-
merous channels of contact and interdepen-
dence between Turkey and ISIS; the continued 
existence of ISIS is being factored into Turkey’s 
regional policy, and may indirectly enhance Tur-
key’s position in the region (this element limits 
the Syrian Kurds, and is primarily a problem 
for Damascus, Baghdad and Turkey’s regional 
rival, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are 
the main targets of the ISIS operation). Witho-
ut a doubt, however, ISIS also poses a challen-
ge and a threat to Turkey, as is shown both by 
the problems of Turkish policy in Syria and the 
incidents involving the organisation in Turkey, 
as well as the occupation of the consulate in 
Mosul and the hostage-taking. 
The public’s genuine support for the gov-
ernment, but also the increasing authori-
tarian tendencies in Turkey make the gov-
ernment in Ankara fairly resistant to any 
socio-political pressures to alter its poli-
cy, and allow it to plan and implement its 
strategy in the long term. 
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The last key duality in Turkey’s approach to the 
situation in the region stems from the nature of 
its domestic policy. Although the Turkish public is 
concerned about the developments in the Mid-
dle East, has been feeling the effects of the crisis, 
and is reluctant to see any active involvement by 
Turkey, in comparison with Europe it is well used 
to the volatility of its southern neighbourhood, 
as well as political violence in its own country 
(as a result of the bloody and long-standing con-
flict with the Kurds, a tradition of political and so-
cial tensions, and a certain regularity of terrorist 
attacks in Turkey). However, it is of fundamental 
importance that since coming to power in 2002, 
the ruling AKP has won each election with sup-
port of at least 40 per cent. Given the funda-
mental weaknesses of the opposition, the AKP is 
the clear favourite to win both the presidential 
election (10 August) and next year’s parliamen-
tary elections. The public’s relative indifference to 
the crisis in the Middle East, their genuine support 
for the government, but also the increasing au-
thoritarian tendencies in Turkey (including limiting 
access to information) make the government 
in Ankara fairly resistant to any socio-political 
pressures to alter its policy, remove it from public 
debate, and – for better or worse – allow it to plan 
and implement its strategy in the long term. 
Conclusions and prospects 
The current crisis in Iraq, which is the current 
stage of the wider crisis in the Middle East, is 
posing serious challenges to Turkey. The hypo-
thetical gains (potential to strengthen Ankara’s 
influence in Iraqi Kurdistan, easier access to lo-
cal energy resources) do not outweigh the cur-
rent problems (the issue of the hostages taken 
by ISIS) and the expected flood of instability 
onto Turkey’s territory. Both the negative re-
sult of Turkey’s policy towards Syria in recent 
years, as well as the domestic context (presi-
dential elections in August and parliamentary 
elections in 2015), mean that Ankara’s policy 
towards Iraq and the region is most likely to be 
cautious and reactive, if it does not exacerbate 
the Kurdish problem in Turkey itself. 
Neither the shortcomings of its current policy 
towards the Middle East, nor the risks associa-
ted with the dynamic and constantly deterio-
rating situation in the region, nor a cautious 
policy towards the region which would be ideal 
for the Turkish authorities over the next year, 
mean that Turkey is abandoning its regional 
ambitions. The country’s ruling elite has am-
bitions to significantly strengthen its position 
in the Middle East in the long term, and is acti-
vely seeking political instruments which will be 
adequate to the situation. 
However, even if the ambitions of Turkey could 
have been perceived in 2011 as a potential re-
inforcement for the Middle East policies of the 
West (the US, NATO, the EU), today this is less 
and less likely. The crisis in the Middle East is 
constantly deepening; the West is conducting 
a less active and consistent policy towards the 
region, and the community of perception and 
complementarity in action between the West 
and Turkey, which is fighting for a better place 
for itself in the Middle East, becomes weaker. 
